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Abstract
This study examined how attribution of emotion influences decision making on the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT). People are believed to rely on subtle unconscious changes in emotion to 
switch their preference from the bad decks to the good decks on the IGT. The current study 
looked at how attributing emotion to an external source instead of the internal cues that are 
thought to be used in this task, influences performance on the IGT. All Participants were given a 
placebo before they began the IGT and they were told that it helps with measuring skin 
conductance. The control group was not given any more information while the experimental 
group participants were told that the placebo caused an increase in heart rate and respiration. 
Participants in the experimental condition were expected to perform worse on the task than the 
controls because they were expected to believe the affect that arises from performing the task is 
due to the placebo and thus ignore internal cues to move away from bad decks. The results were 
in the opposite direction of the predicted results and those who were in the experimental group 
learned faster than the control group.
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Introduction
Affect has recently emerged as aiding the decisions people make. Finucane, Peters, and 
Slovic (2003) define affect as, “‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (1) experienced as a feeling state (with 
or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a specific 
stimulus. Stimulus representations associated with affect can include external as well as internal 
representations (p. 328).” Affect as an aide in decision making received more attention by the 
psychology community in the second half of the twentieth century. The first step in the process 
of affect being seen as an aide in decision making was when people started viewing affect as an 
orientation mechanism to important stimuli. Simon (1967) suggested the importance of affect in 
learning and how it is used to direct people’s attention to things they find important. In decision 
making the stimuli that receive the most attention are usually the stimuli that have the most 
weight when making decisions. So, in other words, the more affective a stimulus the more 
attention it will receive and the more likely the affective stimulus will influence a person’s 
decision when compared to a neutral stimulus. Zajonc (1980) proposed that decision making is 
influenced more by affect than anything else. He argued that people choose things that they like 
and the main reason they buy a certain item is because they liked it. Recent research by Antonio 
Damasio has implicated affect as having more of an influence on the decisions people make. 
Damasio was interested in studying patients with brain damage to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). This interest stemmed from the case of Phineas Gage, who was a 
railroad foreman who survived a blast that shot a tamping iron through his skull. He seemed 
perfectly fine after the accident and soon went back to work. After awhile people started to 
notice that he had uncharacteristic emotional outbursts and was unable to make good social 
decisions. He was eventually fired from his job. Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, and 
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Damasio (1994) researched Gage’s skull and determined that the area damaged by the iron 
involved the VMPFC.  Eslinger and Damasio (1985) examined a patient with damage to his 
orbitofrontal cortex who they called EVR. He showed poor decision making with regard to his 
professional and social life. EVR was given tests ranging from IQ to memory tests. He 
performed average or above average on all the psychological tasks he was given. He even 
performed normally on social morality tasks, he knew what the social norms were, but failed to 
actually abide by these in real life situations. Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994) 
designed a task they called the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) that measures uncertainty in decision 
making. This task is supposed to imitate real life decision making. The task measures long term 
rewards/losses and short term reward/losses, and the goal is to choose more from the decks that 
have high long term rewards and small long term losses by the end of the task. He had people 
with brain damage to the VMPFC, controls with brain damage to other areas of the brain, and 
normal controls perform the IGT. The patients with brain damage to the VMPFC performed 
worse on the IGT than the control groups. Control groups eventually moved away from the decks 
that had bad payoffs and toward the better paying decks, but the VMPFC patients continued to 
select from the bad decks. This task showed that VMPFC patients who have their rational brains 
intact did not switch their preference from the bad decks to the good decks. Bechara , Tranel, 
Damasio, and Damasio (1997) had people perform the IGT while their skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) were measured. He wanted to examine whether or not there is some function 
before conscious reasoning that directs people away from the bad decks and toward the good 
decks. He found that both VMPFC patients and controls developed SCRs after gaining and 
losing money. He also noticed that controls developed anticipatory SCRs before selecting from 
decks, whereas VMPFC patients failed to develop these responses. The anticipatory SCR 
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findings are seen as being an affective response to the decks and they help guide behavior away 
from bad decks and toward good decks. This evidence was incorporated into Damasio’s Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis (SMH).
Damasio (1996) hypothesized that people use affect to reduce the amount of choices to 
evaluate and help guide people toward decisions that are associated with a positive somatic 
marker. Damasio (1996) explains that people have initial experiences with outcomes of choices 
they make. These outcomes and how they made a person feel and its associated physiological 
response are encoded into somatic markers. When the person encounters similar situations he/she 
brings forth these somatic markers and if the marker is associated with a negative affective state 
then the less likely he/she will make the same choice in the new situation. The somatic markers 
and the emotions associated with the markers are believed to be linked in the VMPFC. Damasio 
(1994) proposed that there are two routes in which somatic markers can be activated, the as-if 
loops and the body-loops. The body-loop is the route theorized to be used during the IGT, and it 
is when the somatic marker reactivates the same physiological arousal that occurred during the 
formation of the marker. The as-if loop is when the somatic only reactivates the somatosensory 
cortex’s representation of the body, and actual physiological arousal is not activated. In the IGT 
people experience increase in SCRs to the rewards and losses at the beginning of the task, these 
responses become encoded as somatic markers. Soon people are able to recall the markers and 
reconstitute that body state when they are deciding what card decks to select from, and these 
markers are manifested as anticipatory SCRs. According to Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, H., and 
Damasio, A.R. (1997) people were unaware of any good or bad decks when they started to show 
theses anticipatory responses and preference for the advantageous decks. By the time people 
have made it about half way through the task they have some hunch as to what decks are good 
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and bad. This phase is associated with even more selections from the good decks. Maybe there is 
some cognition needed to help make the switch from the bad decks to the good decks.
People’s cognitions may actually be used to scan their environments for causes of 
increased affective arousal, and people determine how they feel depending on what results these 
searches yield. Lazarus (1984) argues that emotions are a result of how people cognitively 
appraise their situation. People have an increase in affect and search their environment for a 
reason for the increased affect. The cognitive evaluation of the situation determines how the 
increased affect is appraised and how it is appraised determines the emotion that is elicited. 
Schachter and Singer (1962) developed the two-factor theory of emotion which was one of the 
first looks at appraisal theory. Participants were given a shot of epinephrine that was explained as 
being a vitamin supplement and that people would perform a vision test later in the experiment. 
Participants were told that the effects of epinephrine were associated with increased 
physiological arousal, or they were not told the side effects of the shot, or they were misinformed 
of the side effects of the shot and told that it caused numbness in the feet and itchiness. 
Participants were then placed in a waiting room with a confederate. In the waiting room they had 
to fill out a questionnaire. Confederates either acted euphoric, making paper airplanes, or angry, 
getting upset about the questions on the questionnaire. Participants told about the correct side 
effects of epinephrine acted in a normal manner, but people in both the misinformed and 
uninformed groups reported feeling happy when the confederate was euphoric or upset when the 
confederate was angry. Participants also started to imitate the behaviors of the confederate in 
both the uninformed and misinformed conditions. These results indicate that people use their 
cognition to interpret emotional arousal, so if people have an increase in their physiological state 
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and they have no explanation for why they are having this reaction, then they will look to the 
situation to determine what is causing that increase in affect. 
Subsequent research has studied the appraisal theory by observing its influence in 
everyday day life. Dutton and Aron (1974) had an attractive female research assistant give a 
questionnaire to men who were alone and either crossing a 230 feet high suspension bridge over 
a canyon or a small bridge over a small creek. The questionnaire included some filler questions 
and the subjects then had to write a story about a picture, the stories were then measured for 
sexual content. Subjects were given the research assistant’s phone number in case they wanted to 
talk about the study more. People on the high bridge had more sexual imagery in their stories and 
were more likely to call the research assistant than the subjects on the low bridge. This study 
further supports the notion that emotion is a result of cognition. Subjects on the high bridge were 
more likely to have increased arousal due to the height of the bridge and attribute this feeling to 
the being attracted to the female talking to them. Since the basic principle of appraisal theory is 
the use of cognition to interpret affective arousal, then it’s possible to view this model within the 
framework of the SMH.
According to the SMH (1996) when people start to shift their preference from the bad 
decks to good decks, they are evaluating these somatic markers and comparing the current 
situation with past similar situations. If the current situation is compared to a bad situation and an 
associated level of affect, then a person will be less likely to behave in the same way that they 
did in the previous situation and vice versa. This evaluation process can be seen as an attribution 
because a person attributes the increased physiological arousal to the bad decks and then he/she 
learns to start avoiding those decks and pick more from the good decks. If people are using 
attributions to help them perform better on the IGT, then this process could be interrupted by 
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having people misattribute the cause of their increase in affect. The current study will investigate 
how performance on the IGT will be affected when people misattribute the cause of their 
increased physiological arousal to an external event rather than being caused by the bad card 
decks.
 Participants in this study will all be given a placebo solution, and they will be told that it 
helps measure skin conductance. Participants who are given a solution and told that it increases 
heart rate and respiration, concepts associated with an increase in affect and physiological 
arousal, are expected to perform worse on the IGT than people who are not told that a placebo 
has side effects. This is expected because in the IGT people rely on their affect or somatic states 
that are activated by their somatic markers in response to the bad decks. If people believe that 
increases in affect are being caused by an external event instead of their internal reactions to the 
bad decks, then they are hypothesized to attribute their changes in affect to the external event 
rather than to the card decks and take longer to make the switch to the good card decks. Kadous 
(2001) had participants misattribute anxiety caused by negative outcomes of audit cases to 
anxiety that was explained as being caused by taking on the role of a juror and having to make 
difficult decisions. By attributing the anxiety to themselves instead of the bad outcome they were 
more likely to base their verdict on the quality of the audit rather than the negative outcome of 
evaluating blameworthiness of auditors. In the current study the performance difference is 
expected to be seen in the block of cards where anticipatory responses usually start to occur and 
participants are not yet aware of any bad or good cards. There should be no difference between 
groups in the beginning of the task because people randomly select from the different card decks. 
There is expected to be little differences later in the task because this is where people are able to 
conceptualize why the bad decks are bad and why the good decks are good. De Vries, Holland, 
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and Witteman (2008) used a method of separating the cards into different blocks when 
researching the influence of mood on IGT performance. They also expected the group 
differences to only be significant during the pre-hunch phase. The current study uses a 
computerized form of the IGT. Bechara, Damasio, H., Damasio, A.R., and Lee (1999) had 
participants designed a computerized form of the IGT and found that there was no difference 
between performance on that version and the actual card version that they used in the original 
study. To ensure participants were motivated to perform the task, they could win up to five 
dollars depending on how well they perform.
Methods
Participants and Design. One hundred participants enrolled in an introductory psychology course 
participated in the experiment for course credit and were paid up to five dollars depending on 
performance on the IGT. Some participants were excluded from the analyses. Twelve 
participants encountered occasional computer errors that prevented them from finishing the task, 
three participants decided not to participate in the study after learning the requirements, five 
participants did not believe the manipulation, and twenty-three participants failed to  choose a 
card within the four seconds before the next set of cards were presented or their reaction times 
were too fast. After participants were dropped there were a total of fifty-seven participants. 
Twenty-two participants were in the experimental condition and the control condition consisted 
of thirty-five participants. The design of the experiment was a between participants design with 
two conditions. Participants in both the control and experimental group were told to drink a 
solution, a tonic water and water mixture that helps measure skin conductance. Participants that 
were in the control condition were given no further instructions. Participants in the experimental 
condition were told that the solution along with helping measure skin conductance caused a safe 
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increase in heart rate and respiration. The solution actually has no effect on measuring skin 
conductance nor does it increase heart rate or respiration.
Iowa Gambling Task. The IGT was programmed in E-Prime by the CCL lab at the University of 
Indiana. The IGT consists of four card decks labeled A, B, C, and D. Decks A and B are 
considered bad decks because every ten selections from these decks results in an overall negative 
value of 250 dollars. Selections from Deck A always yields a gain of 100 dollars, but on top of 
this 100 dollar gain participants will lose between 150 and 350 dollars five out of every ten 
selections. Deck B, on the other hand, has the same guaranteed 100 dollar reward as deck A, but 
instead of losing money half the time, every ten selections participants will lose 1250 dollars. 
The other two decks, C and D, are considered the good decks because after every ten selections 
from these decks incurs a gain of 250 dollars. Deck C and D have smaller immediate rewards 
than decks A and B; each selection always yields a 50 dollar gain. When participants choose 
from deck C they lose between 25 and 75 dollars on five out of every ten selections; although 
they still receive 50 dollars from selecting this deck. Participants selecting cards from deck D 
will lose 250 dollars after ten selections on top of gaining 50 dollars for choosing from that deck. 
All rewards are programmed to happen at a particular card selection and thus do not occur 
randomly. Cards are selected by participants pressing keys 1 through 4, 1 being for deck A on 
the left side of the screen, 2 for deck B, 3 for deck C, and 4 for deck D located on the far right 
side of the screen. Each card selection is present on the screen for four seconds. During this time 
participants are to choose a card or else the next set of cards will be presented and they will be 
penalized 100 dollars. The goal of the task is to win as much money as possible.
Procedure. The experiment was posted on the Research Experience Program (REP) website. 
People enrolled in Psychology 100 who were age 18 years or older were able to enroll in the 
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experiment. The experiment was described as being a study looking at physiological correlates of 
gambling performance. Participants received a half hour credit if they chose to participate in the 
thirty minute study. Participants were told that they would have their skin conductance measured 
via a sensor electrode on their hand. The experiments were open to a maximum of six 
participants at a time. Skin conductance was not actually measured. SCR electrodes were 
attached to the back to each of the six computer towers via electrical tape. The experiment was 
loaded onto each of the computers. The solution was comprised of half diet tonic water and half 
tap water and this solution was poured into paper cups. The solution was also prepared before 
participants entered to room for the experiment. The participants were instructed to wait in the 
Lazenby Basement waiting area until their names were called out. The participants then were 
lead to the lab. Upon entering the lab they were instructed to wash their hands, to increase the 
believability that the SCRs were going to be measured. Once everyone washed their hands they 
were told to sit down at a computer. Here they were presented with two consent forms, one for 
them to keep and one for them to sign and give back to the experimenter. At this point they were 
informed that they could win up to five dollars depending on how well they did on the gambling 
task. Before they signed the consent forms, they were told that they would have to drink a 
solution that aided in measuring skin conductance. The experimental group was also told that 
this solution also increased heart rate and respiration. There were a total of twenty-six sessions, 
thirteen control and thirteen experimental sessions. Participants who agreed to drink the solution 
signed the consent form and turned in one copy to the experimenter before beginning the study. 
Participants were then handed the paper cup with the solution and were told to drink the solution 
before the skin conductance sensor electrodes could be attached to their hands. After they drank 
the solution the sensor electrodes were attached to their right hands. The computer displayed the 
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instructions on how to perform the task. Participants were asked to read the instructions and then 
asked if they all understood the instructions. Participants were then instructed to press the enter 
key once they read and understood the instructions. All the people started with a credit of 2000 
dollars, not real currency, at the beginning of the task. The task ended after 100 card selections, 
participants were not made aware of how many cards they would choose before they were done 
with the task. About one out of every ten participants experienced program errors at some point 
during the task and were not able to complete the task. After participants were done with the IGT 
a screen showed their final score. Once people were finished with the task a file was 
automatically created containing the data. The experimenter removed the SCR electrodes and 
then paid the participants money depending on their final score. The payment was determined 
from a pilot study that eighteen people took part in and the scores were averaged. Participants 
filled out funds reimbursement and receipt forms. Debriefing papers were handed out and 
participants were then free to leave the experiment. 
Results
I hypothesized that participants would choose randomly from the four decks at the 
beginning of the task (cards 1-25), and for this reason I expected there to be no difference 
between groups until later in the task. Even though performance is expected to increase later in 
the task (cards 51-100), the effects of condition should occur in the second quartile (cards 26-
50). This is the point where people typically learn to switch to the good decks, when anticipatory 
SCRs/ activation of somatic markers are thought to begin, but too early for people to be aware of 
any rules. Since this is where people are thought to start attributing the anticipatory SCRs to the 
bad decks, then people who have an incorrect explanation for arousal will likely not make the 
switch here. To test these a priori hypotheses, a 2 (condition) x 4(quartile) analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA; see Figure 1) was performed. There was a main effect of quartile showing that 
participants learned the task over time (F (1,165) = 6.98, p<.001; see Figure 1). Though, there 
was no main effect of condition (F (1, 55) = 0.04, p = ns) and there was no interaction of time by 
condition (F (3, 165) = 1.49), p = ns). The misattribution manipulation may not have influenced 
learning.
Additional analyses were performed on cards 26-50, because of the a priori prediction 
that the biggest difference would be seen here. During this block participants in the control group 
chose correctly 46.63% of the time (SD = 10.54, range 20-68). As predicted, the experimental 
group picked from the good decks 44.63% of the time (SD = 13, range 20-68). Although this was 
in the anticipated direction, the effect was not significant (t (56) = 0.91, p = .4737).
Because the blocks of trial were divided into four blocks, I examined whether the 
predicted slopes were different between the two conditions. For each participant, I examined the 
relationship between trial as a continuous variable and whether the participant made the correct 
selection. So, the larger the slope the more a participant learned. I performed a logistic regression 
analysis to analyze correct selections for each of the participants. On average, participants made 
correct answers as they progressed through the task (F (1, 56) = 28.71, p < .0001: mean slope .
127). Again, there was no effect of condition (F (1, 56) = 2.21, p =ns), but now there was an 
interaction between trial number and condition (F (1, 56) = 5.79, p ¸.05). Comparing the slopes 
showed that participants in the experimental condition had larger slopes than participants in the 
control condition (.07; see Figure 2). This was in the opposite of the prediction.
Discussion
The results replicated previous findings by (Bechara, Damasio, A., Damasio, H., and 
Anderson (1994), Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, and Damasio (1997), Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, 
Attribution and Decision Making 14
and Lee (1999), Bechara, Tranel, and Damasio (2000)) that people, without damage to the 
VMPFC, learn to switch their preference from the bad decks to the good decks as they progress 
through the IGT. The conditions were compared at Block 2 and there were no significant 
differences between performances at this block. The original hypothesis stated that performance 
would decrease on the IGT for participants if they attributed affective arousal to an external 
source. This performance reduction was expected to be seen around card twenty-five, when 
people start to show anticipatory SCRs. This was because participants were expected to attribute 
the anticipatory SCRs to the bad decks. The differences were expected to be smaller in cards 51 
through 100, due to both groups being able to conceptualize the goodness and badness of each 
deck around this point. Results showed this was not the case and participants in the experimental 
condition started to do better than the control group around card 50. These results are after 
people had to be dropped from analyses due to computer errors, not following instructions, or not 
believing the manipulation. Possibly more participants should be run to make sure that these 
results are not due to sampling error. The results may implicate another process involved in the 
IGT instead of the proposed attributional one. A new hypothesis could look at the possibility of 
attention processes in the IGT and there are two ways the manipulation could have increased 
attention in the experimental group.
The first possible explanation for these results is the experimental manipulation served as 
a priming mechanism. By telling people that a solution increased heart rate and respiration they 
could have become more aware of their physiological state. This explanation has been seen in 
studies like Schwarz and Clore (1983), where participants were not aware of how the bad 
weather was influencing their mood until the weather was mentioned to them. The activity of the 
autonomic nervous system is usually below people’s awareness and is ignored until it becomes 
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activated above a certain point, or people are told to monitor their breathing or heart rate. This 
activation of one’s body state could increase monitoring of his/her physiological arousal during 
the IGT. As participants win and lose money they may become more sensitive to the rise in 
affect that is associated with the consequences of each deck. Participants may also be more 
sensitive to the anticipatory responses that occur later in the task, but a bigger difference would 
be expected during Block 2 where anticipatory SCRs begin to occur. A possible way to test this 
interpretation would be to add a third condition where participants are told that the solution does 
not have any side effects and should not create any physiological arousal. If telling people about 
heart rate and respiration makes them aware of their bodily state, then telling people that there 
would not be any increase in things like heart rate and respiration would still make them think 
about their autonomic activity. In this possible experiment, there would be no expected 
difference between the condition where people are told of possible side effects and the condition 
where people are specifically told that there are no side effects dealing with heart rate and 
respiration.
There is also a possibility that people believed that the solution actually increased 
physiological arousal and this influenced their performance on the IGT. The increase in arousal 
may have also helped participants monitor their physiological state more easily and this allowed 
for them to notice what cards were bad and make the shift to the good decks faster than the 
control group. One simple way to test this new hypothesis would be to measure physiological 
activation by monitoring heart rate variability and skin conductance. If there is simply more 
activation in the experimental group then this could be better supported. A combination of heart 
rate measures and a third condition where participants are specifically told that a solution does 
not affect heart rate or respiration could be a follow up study. In this new study there would be 
Attribution and Decision Making 16
an expected increase in physiological activity in the condition where participants are told about 
side effects, but no difference between the autonomic activation in the control condition and the 
condition in which participants are told that there are no side effects. The performance on the 
IGT would still be expected to remain higher in condition where side effects are expected 
compared to the other two conditions. The results could have also been due to certain 
expectations.
The results may be due to demand characteristics resulting in a negative participant role 
by the experimental group. Participants in the experimental group may have doubted the 
manipulation or at some point in the experiment noticed no difference in their physiological 
arousal. This skepticism could have lead to participants paying more attention to the task and 
possibly be a reason for increased performance during the second half of the experiment. This 
was partially checked for by asking participants in the experimental group if they believed that 
there was an increase in heart rate and respiration due to the solution. Those who said that they 
did not believe the manipulation at all were removed from the data analysis. This may not 
account for people who doubted the experiment, but they were not fully cognizant of this doubt 
and not fully able to explain it. This possibility would be hard to verify, but we could ask some 
questions that relate the how physiologically aroused they feel after every ten card selections. 
These questions would also have to be designed as to not influence the participant’s knowledge 
of the hypothesis and lead to new expectancy biases. This manipulation may not actually be 
feasible, but if such a questionnaire was possible, then one would expect a decrease in the 
believability that the solution caused an increase in physiological arousal in the second half of 
the experiment. 
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The experimenter may also have subconsciously communicated the expectation that 
participants in the experiment should perform poorly on the task and thus the participants tried 
harder on the task to prove the experimenter wrong. This possibility would be easily be checked 
by designing the experiment to be a double-blind study. This could be helped by making the 
experimenter unaware of the purpose of the study and what the hypothesis is for performance on 
the IGT is for the conditions. Also instructions regarding the effects of the solution could be 
presented on the computer instead of being read by the experimenter. 
The results of this study provide interesting implications and directions for further 
research on misattribution and decision making. The proposed interpretations could still fit in the 
framework of attribution and the SMH because if a person has increased attention to their 
physiological state then he/she might have a better ability to label a deck as bad when attributing 
the bad deck to the arousal. The conclusion that people may be aware of internal affective 
changes that result from the IGT would implicate that paying attention to one’s affective 
responses to a situation may help move that person in the direction of making a good decision. 
Since the interpretations of the results indicate that participants did not actually misattribute their 
affect, a new study should be designed to try to manipulate misattribution in a better way. 
Kadous (2001) showed that telling participants that it’s natural to feel anxious being placed in 
the position of a juror actually had participants misattribute the negative feelings caused by the 
negative outcomes of an audit to themselves. Something similar could be used to manipulate 
how people make attributions. 
The IGT has also received a fair amount of criticism over the past few years. Dunn, 
Dalgleish, and Lawrence (2006) reviewed research using the IGT since it was first used and they 
have found possible issues with its design. Future studies might look at performance on the 
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Soochow Gambling Task (SGT) instead of the IGT. Chiu et al. (2008) designed the SGT to show 
that people are guided by gain-loss frequency instead of expected value. They switch the deck 
values to have higher gain-loss frequencies for the bad decks and lower gain-loss frequencies for 
the good decks. The results showed that participants preferred the decks with worse expected 
value over the decks with the higher expected value. Until the validity of the IGT with regard to 
what good decision making is discerned, no solid conclusions can be made about the results of 
this study.
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